Results: Searching for 'Policy Briefing Paper'

This briefing is based on two propositions.

First, that gas security matters, because today in the UKgas plays a dominant role in the provision of energy services, accounting for almost 40% of total inland primary energy consumption in 2017. Thus, a shortrun failure of gas security would undoubtedly have significant political and economic consequences.

Second, that the current measure is far too narrow to offer a comprehensive assessment of UK gas security, particularly in a post-Brexit context. Discussions at the Gas Security Forum suggested that:the measure of gas securityfocuses only on infrastructure capacity and not supply (capacity does not equal flow); it fails to take account of the time-lag for gas delivery; it does not measure diversity or spare capacity; it ignores the impact of multiple asset failures; and, does not consider the costs associated with ensuring greater security.

It is in this context that this paper seeks to address the following questions:

• What are the constituent factors to consider in assessing gas security?
• What alternative measures exist?
• What potentially threatens gas security in the UK?
• What would a better approach to gas security look like?

The thinking behind this paper is that a more extensive approach to measuring UK gas security is needed to address the less dramatic challenges that face UK gas security, as well as the chance of managing a Black Swanevent.

• Market, policy and regulatory frameworks
• Business models and customer offerings
• Integrated vehicle and infrastructure systems and technologies using electricity, liquid fuel and hydrogen
• Consumer and fleet attitudes to adoption and usage behaviours

• NET Power technology has the potential to be a gamechanger.
• Modelling analysis confirms that NET Power’s supercritical CO₂ power cycle has the potential to deliver carbon capture at efficiencies higher than conventional amine solutions.
• Some unpublished innovations which NET Power are protecting as trade secrets are needed to make the technology as cost efficient as an unabated CCGT, which is still improving rapidly.
• The technology is immature and has multiple development hurdles to overcome and therefore it is likely to take several years before it is commercially available at scale. It is therefore likely to be best suited for deployment once other elements of CCS have been de-risked (i.e. transport and storage) rather than in a First of a Kind full scale development.

• UK-grown biomass can deliver genuine, system-level, greenhouse gas savings.
• Planting around 1.4 Mha of second generation (non-food) bioenergy crops, such as Miscanthus, Short Rotation Coppice (SRC) willow and Short Rotation Forestry (SRF), by the 2050s would make a signifi cant contribution to delivering a cost-effective, low carbon energy system. This is equivalent to ~7.5% of the total agricultural area of the UK.
• Steadily increasing the area of bioenergy crops in the UK (averaging around 30-35 kha/yr of new planting out to the 2050s) would allow the sector to ‘learn by doing’ and develop best practices, as well as monitor and manage impacts on other markets and the wider environment.
• Delivering a substantial energy crops sector whilst balancing the demand for land from other sectors will require an increase in land productivity and a reduction in food waste throughout the supply chain.
• The market for second generation energy crops is nascent.
• As the UK prepares to leave the European Union, there is an opportunity to restructure farming support in a way which provides long-term clarity and support to farmers and encourages the sustainable growth of the UK biomass sector

• Offshore Wind
  • Is a proven technology that is being deployed commercially with a credible path to becoming competitive with the lowest cost low carbon technologies
  • The focus for technology development is now on – improving yields, reducing capital & operational costs and achieving wider deployment
  • A stable policy and funding environment into the medium term would accelerate the achievement of energy cost competitiveness
• Tidal Stream Energy
  • Is at a much earlier stage in the innovation chain
  • Its innovation needs are known and the challenge is one of how to put the component parts together in deployable systems rather than having to reinvent the technology
  • MeyGen’s Inner Sound project, the world’s first tidal stream array is pivotal to advancing the technology and developing supply chain capability

• Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) have the potential to reduce Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions over the well-to-motion pathway by 13% (LNG) - 20%(CNG) for dedicated engines and 16% (LNG) - 24%(CNG) for High Pressure Direct Injection engines per vehicle in the 2035 timeframe in comparison to the reference baselinediesel pathway.
• Cycle specific powertrain technology selection and pathway optimisation are key to providing GHG emission benefits over given usage cycles, with High Pressure Direct Injection and Dedicated gas engines providing the highest benefit.
• Retrofit dual fuel engines have been shown to have high methane emissions, often being worse than baseline diesel powertrains on a GHG emission basis. Effective testing procedures and legislative certainty are required to ensure emissions conformity and facilitate market development
• Providing methane catalysis at real world operating temperatures, i.e. below 350°C, is essential to prevent uncombusted methane making its way out of the tailpipe in powertrains that cannot control methane slip and is a key technology that enables a pathway benefit.
• Employing ‘best practices’ at LNG, CNG and L-CNG stations is a key driver to providing pathway benefits. Vapour recovery systems should be implemented at all LNG stations and the economic proposition and expected utilisation should be aligned. CNG stations should be connected to the highest pressure tier of the grid where possible or employed in combination with a L-CNG station as an easy step to reduce emissions associated with compression, at least until the carbon intensity of the grid is significantly lower than today.
• The economic proposition for natural gas in the HGV fleet hinges upon the fuel duty differential and currently only the long haul segment is economic in the near term. Fuel duty tax stability is key to enable market confi dence to invest in natural gas vehicles and the necessary supporting infrastructure.

• Planting 30 - 35 kha/yr of second generation crops (Miscanthus, Short Rotation Coppice (SRC) willow and Short  Rotation Forestry (SRF)) would keep the UK on the trajectory to deliver a bioenergy sector of the scale needed to help cost-effectively decarbonise the UK energy system.
• Due to the seasonal nature of bioenergy crop planting, management and harvesting, the majority of job opportunities will be part-time, but are complimentary to the seasonal demands of other roles in the agricultural and forestry sectors, particularly arable farming.By 2032, a 30 kha/yr planting rate could create around 8,100 job opportunities in the busiest months (or 4,300 Full Time Equivalent (FTE) jobs when averaged across the year). By the 2050s, around 16,700 opportunities could be created during peak periods (9,100 FTE jobs across the year).
• The UK is not currently in a position to deliver a planting rate of 30 kha/yr – the total planted area of Miscanthus and SRC willow has remained at around 10 kha in recent years with a limited number of players in the market. Investment is needed in the production of plant breeding materials, including research into new establishment techniques to reduce costs. Investment is also needed in training and specialised equipment for planting and harvesting.
• As the UK prepares to leave the European Union, there is an opportunity to restructure farming support in a way which encourages the sustainable growth of the UK biomass sector. This could place a value on the wider environmental benefits growing second generation energy crops can make to the farming landscape.

• Respondents have consistently supported government-led action to tackle greenhouse gas emissions. In 2017, over half of respondents (58%) thought that the government should do more to reduce emissions, with only 6% believing that the government should reduce efforts to lower emissions.
• Support for producing bioenergy from both biomass and waste has been consistently strong across all three surveys with the highest levels of support recorded in the most recent survey. Across the three surveys between 72% and 77% of respondents supported the use of biomass, and 81-84% supported the use of waste for bioenergy production.
• Bioenergy is associated with several positive features. The ability to generate energy from waste has consistently been the positive feature most selected by respondents. The ETI’s broader analysis highlights the importance of using waste feedstocks effectively to deliver emissions savings. In order to help achieve this, the ETI is investing in a 1.5 MWe waste gasifi cation demonstration plant with syngas clean-up.
• In all three surveys, competition for land and having to import biomass because not enough is produced in the UK have been perceived by respondents as the main negative features of bioenergy. Our 2016 report explored these views in more detail and concluded that using a mix of imported and domestic feedstocks could be publically acceptable, such that the UK is not overly reliant on imports and can maintain at least current levels of food self-sufficiency
• The government has consistently been the most popular choice to lead the development of the bioenergy sector, but a greater number of respondents trust scientists/academics or experts in the field, independent consumer or industry watchdogs, and environmental interest groups to provide reliable information on the sector. This suggests it will be crucial for different groups to work together to increase awareness and understanding of bioenergy while developing the sector in the UK.

• The UK can implement an affordable (approximately 1% of GDP) 35-year transition to a low carbon energy system by developing, commercialising and integrating known – but currently underdeveloped solutions
• There is enormous potential and value in CCS and bioenergy in delivering alow carbon future
• The ability (or failure) to deploy these two technologies will have a huge impact on the cost of achieving the UK climate change targets and the national architecture of low carbon systems and future infrastructure requirements
• To avoidwasting investment, crucial decisions must be made about the design of the future UK energy system, driven by choices on infrastructure
• The next decade is critical in preparing for transition
• Preparation will require major investments in developing and proving key technology options by the mid 2020s
• Preparation creates options, demonstrates leadershipand provides scope for economic advantage in a global market place
• Planned UK spend is probably sufficient, if it is targeted to develop genuine deployment readiness of the most strategically valuable options on the pathway to 2050
• Significant policy intervention will be required to support key technologies with characteristics that make a pure market approach difficult (e.g. CCS, bioenergy, nuclear, offshore wind, heat networks

• Low cost sensors that enable many things to be measured – for example all the information that cars now have available.
• Communications infrastructure that enables data to be transported almost anywhere on the planet.
• Relatively low cost storage and processing power that is scalable, so you mostly only pay for what you need.
• Software tools that enable data to be transformed to produce information and insight that can be displayed in a way that people can easily grasp.
• Social and business ecosystems that set expectations and enable us to share and transact without relying on a single point of control.
• Rating sites such as TripAdvisor, blogs, PayPal and social media channels all provide social and commercial models that increase individual knowledgeand empowerment.

These elements have only just started to penetrate energy, which has been held back significantly by the current governance structures. Energy presents similar challenges to those of finance where changes which should benefit consumers come with new risks. However, giving people more freedom in how they buy and use energy should carry less risk than giving them freedoms over their pensions and other investments.

This briefing paper examines how renewables in Scotland are shaped by decisions taken by the Scottish Government, the UK Government and the EU. Drawing on interviews with stakeholders, it explores the potential impact of Brexit on Scottish renewables.

Brexit has the potential to disrupt this relatively supportive policy environment in three ways in regulatory and policy frameworks governing renewable energy; access to EU funding streams; and trade in energy and related goods and services.

Our briefing identifies varying levels of concern among key stakeholders in Scotland. Many expect policy continuity, irrespective of the future UK-EU relationship. There is more concern about access to research and project funding, and future research and development collaboration, especially for more innovative renewable technologies. The UK will become a third country forthe purposes of EU funding streams, able to participate, but not lead on renewables projects, and there is scepticism about whether lost EU funding streams will be replaced at domestic levels.

While there is no real risk of being unable to access European markets even in a No-Deal Brexit scenario, trade in both energy and related products and services could become more difficult and more expensive affecting both the import of specialist labour and kit from the EU and the export of knowledge-based services. Scotlands attractiveness for inward investment may also be affected.

This briefing note summarises initial findings from qualitative research undertaken as part of a major project investigating public values, attitudes and views on whole energy system change.

A key objective of the project is to identify degrees of public acceptability relating to various aspects of whole energy system transformation and the trade-offs inherent in such transitions. This research has relevance as a research evidence base for informing development of future energy systems, as well as for understanding processes of and potential obstacles to delivery of such transitions.

The latest independent report to the UK government on carbon capture use and storage (CCUS) was published in July this year. The CCUS Cost Challenge Task Force (CCTF) reported under the heading “Delivering Clean Growth”. 

There have also been new pronouncements on CCS in the Committee on Climate Change’s annual update to Parliament and in the National Infrastructure Commission’s National Infrastructure Assessment.

Like everyone else who works in and around CCS in the UK, Ian Temperton, who is also an Advisory Board Member of UKERC, spends vastly more time writing reports and sitting on committees than he does actually trying to capture, transport and store CO₂.

From the perspective of someone who sat on the CCTF and the previous Parliamentary Advisory Group (PAG) on CCS which reported in 2016, he takes a critical look at what these various bodies have said this year and puts them in the context of the many previous reports on the subject.

CCS, a citizen of nowhere?

While CCS needs to be deployed at very large scale for many pathways that restrict global warming to acceptable levels, including those for the UK, progress to date has been negligible.

The UK government seems to have a new enthusiasm for CCS but it is hard to extract a clear strategy from the recent interventions.

The very premise on which the government bases its current approach to CCS looks very much like it wishes to “have its cake and eat it”. The accompanying desire not to look like it is “picking winners” means that recent reports don’t make a particularly compelling case for CCS at all, at least in the medium term.

This challenges the very nature of whole energy systems thinking. CCS, with its potential applications across the energy sector in electricity, heat, transport and heavy industry (not to mention negative emissions) should be, and indeed is, easy to make the whole of system case for. However, being a citizen of the whole energy system makes CCS a citizen of nowhere, and we are no clearer to plotting an efficient route for deployment through the many potential applications of this technology.

The need for a public Delivery Body

The business model for CCS leaves many unanswered questions. What role does regulation have? Should it be publicly or privately financed? How can “full-chain” CCS be delivered? How can we leverage competition (a word which can hardly be spoken in the CCS debate)? How do we create the right incentives for heavy industry? Can we learn from other large infrastructure projects like London’s Super Sewer? And how does CCS fit in an energy system increasingly dominated by low marginal cost sources of supply like renewables?

The paper finds little to suggest that CCS policy in the UK has become any clearer. 

Given the need to develop quickly under such high levels of policy uncertainty, and given that the public sector always has, and always will, fund the majority of the costs of developing CCS, the paper argues for the formation of a public Delivery Body. It also suggests that time is short to make the case and develop the plan for such a body ahead of next year’s UK Government Spending Review.

If we are to harness the new government enthusiasm while addressing the same old uncertainties in CCS policy then there is an inevitable and critical role for a Delivery Body.

This briefing note brings together the current state of policy and activities that CREDS and UKERC have undertaken to support data sharing.

• Carbon capture and storage (CCS) could be a key technology to tackle climate change
• However, there are many economic, political, financial and technological uncertainties that hamper its development and deployment
• Comprehensive government policy support is needed to reduce these uncertainties sufficiently to enable further progress
• It is not necessary to resolve all uncertainties in order to make CCS financeable in the UK
• The UK CCS commercialisation programme needs to make rapid progress, with firm commitments to build several demonstration projects as soon as possible

• Nearly 20 years of climate change policy has failed to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions linked to
  economic activity in the UK.
• Although the UK has met its Kyoto obligations, this has been achieved largely by outsourcing production and
  relying on importing consumer products from abroad to meet growing consumer demand. As UK consumer
  demand has continued to grow, so have the GHG emissions embedded in imported goods.
• If the UK is to measure its overall contribution to changes in global GHG emissions, consumer emission
  accounting offers a sound method for attributing GHG emissions.
• Increased transfer of low-carbon technologies to producer countries, even when technology transfer does not
  form part of any international GHG emissions reduction agreement, will help those countries to reduce their
  emissions and thereby contribute to a true global reduction.
• “Framework conditions” to encourage sustainable consumption might involve government intervention in areas
  such as prices, providing infrastructure for a sustainable lifestyle, and public engagement.

This briefing note summarises Great Britain’s local gas demand from the 2nd of April 2017 to the 6th of March 2018 and compares this to electrical supply. The data covers the UK cold weather event on the 1st March, providing insights into the scale of hourly energy flows through both networks.

A peak hourly local gas demand of 214 GW occurred at 6pm on the 1st of March, which compared to a peak electrical supply of 53 GW occurring at the same time.

The data highlights a critical challenge – managing the 3-hour difference in demand from 5am to 8am on the local gas network during the heating season. Whilst flexibility in the gas system is provided using a change in pressure to store extra energy in the network to meet increasing demand, the electrical system has no comparable intrinsic equivalent.

The findings add to previous work funded by UKERC on thermal energy storage , heat incumbency, and flexibility of electrical systems to provide insights into the decarbonisation of heat in Britain, helping to inform decision-making, modelling of future networks and highlighting key areas for future research and innovation.

A greater research and innovation focus to reduce the 5am-8am 3-hour difference in heat demand is necessary.

Priorities for the Energy Cost Review

This week, the government’s long awaited Clean Growth Strategy will be published. Like many, we will be looking for details of how UK emissions will continue to be reduced to meet the 4^th and 5^th carbon budgets. In particular, the Strategy will need to explain how a range of increasingly significant policy gaps will be addressed.

The Strategy is likely to be closely followed by the conclusions of the Review of Energy Costs, led by Professor Dieter Helm. Ahead of the Strategy’s publication, we are publishing a briefing paper that covers four key issues that are central to the terms of reference of the Review of Energy Costs – and to the Clean Growth Strategy itself.

Our starting point is that the primary issue is the cost of energy bills for consumers, rather than only the unit price of energy. It is therefore important to focus on measures that can reduce the quantity of energy required for a given level of service as well as trends that could help to reduce or moderate prices. In line with the terms of reference, our briefing paper focuses on electricity costs since UK electricity prices are higher up the European league table than those for gas.

Energy efficiency

The role that energy efficiency can play in reducing electricity bills needs to be fully addressed. Significant progress in this area remains to be made; savings of up to 10% can be achieved through well designed standards and investment programmes, and a recent UKERC report highlighted that a 25% reduction in household energy demand is possible through cost effective measures. There is a clear rationale for government intervention, to drive energy efficiency and address the policy gap left behind by the failure of the Green Deal. The case is even clearer when considering the additional economic and social benefits that energy efficiency brings.

Innovation and technology cost reduction

The creation of new markets help drive technology cost reductions, as does patient government support. Offshore wind is a case in point - achieving much lower than expected prices in the recent Contracts for Difference auctions. If these projects are delivered, this will place offshore wind amongst the cheapest new sources of electricity generation in the UK.

Policy change is required to drive further innovation, yet with investor confidence low, this needs to build on existing policy instruments. A case has been made for moving low carbon technologies into a single competitive auction. However this technology neutral approach favours technologies close to market, failing those which are less developed. Complex technologies such as carbon capture and storage, which have significant potential but high capital expenditure and associated risk, could require a state-led approach to investment, allowing for competition to drive prices down.

A systems approach is required

The review’s terms of reference clearly state that a systems approach is required. The consideration of technologies within this perspective is imperative, as is developing energy policy within this context. This is particularly relevant for electricity, where a range of mechanisms and markets are used to balance supply and demand in real time.

System flexibility is key to keeping costs down. The cost of integrating renewables into the grid vary widely, with future cost of integrating intermittent power sources, depending upon the availability of cost effective system flexibility. Incentivising flexibility and reforms to the capacity market will be required to facilitate this, and as the proportion of renewables increases, government will need to decide how to account for system costs including those surrounding intermittency.

Research, development and demonstration

Innovation is an important driver for reducing costs and bringing technologies to market. However this non-linear process exists with multiple feedbacks between development, demonstration and deployment. Effectiveness is further dependent on incentives for demonstration and market creation, and UKERC research has shown that innovation in the energy sector tends to take three to four decades from early stage R&D to significant commercial deployment.

Analysis has been undertaken by government to establish this evidence base, yet too often this has focused on discrete technologies, with less attention paid to system innovation. It is this system innovation which will be key to the low carbon transition, alongside effective evaluation, to learn and disseminate lessons.

Eye catching initiatives such as the Faraday Challenge for storage are welcome, as is the UK pledge - as part of Mission Innovation - to double clean energy R&D spending between 2015-2020. Whilst a step in the right direction, when considering the scale of the challenge posed by climate change, many argue that government support for innovation at a greater scale is required.

Download the briefing note to read the full submission to Dieter Helm.

There is an increasing sense of urgency about the global energy system transition. For many observers an urgent energy transition is also a necessarily disruptive one, in that it is only by radically remaking energy systems that an accelerated transition to low carbon and sustainable energy can be achieved.

Closer to home, there has been substantial progress in some parts of the energy system in the decade since the passing of the UK and Scottish Climate Change Acts. Other areas have shown little sign of change, and the transition ahead may well be more disruptive and intrusive than that seen so far. At the same time, there is also an emerging counter-narrative: that repurposing our existing energy assets (physical and social) offers the best and quickest transition path, since there is insufficient time to disrupt and remake. 

Attending energy events and keeping up-to-date with emerging evidence can instil a sense of different experts talking past each other. For those involved in whole systems energy research, and working at the research-policy interface, this can be deeply frustrating. To help address this, UKERC – working with ClimateXChange (CXC), Scotland’s Centre of Expertise on Climate Change – has spent two years analysing disruption and continuity in the UK energy system.

As part of that work, we surveyed around 130 experts and stakeholders about disruption and continuity-led change in the UK energy transition. The experts were mostly UK based researchers working on ‘whole systems’ research projects, but also included policymakers, advisory bodies, think tanks, businesses (old and new) and civil society organisations. This report presents the results of this survey work.

Overview

A series of energy policy changes announced since the May election have led to concerns about increasing political risk faced by prospective investors in the UK energy system (ECCC 2015). It has also been suggested that policy needs to be ‘reset’, with less technology-specific intervention and increased resources for longer term research into new technologies (Helm 2015). This paper draws on a large body of analysis from UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) and Imperial College.

The paper argues that a ‘reset’ approach is unnecessary, will create delays to investment, increase political risks, and hence costs to consumers. Simply put, the government already has the levers it needs to encourage investment in a secure and lower carbon system. Policy can be made more effective by providing investors with greater clarity and a longer term perspective, using the policy framework that is already in place. Auctions for Contracts for Difference (CfDs) have already brought forward significant reductions in the prices paid to low carbon generators. CfDs could be moved progressively to a technology neutral basis, combined with price caps to bear down further on costs.

The paper discusses the infrastructure implications of new sources of energy and notes that government will need to balance the benefits of technology neutral CfD auctions against the need to develop strategic infrastructure in a timely fashion. It also discusses the impacts of variable renewables and explains that whilst it is important for system costs to be allocated cost effectively this does not mean that variable generators should be obliged to self-balance and invest in dedicated back up.

The paper also explains that whilst greater investment in innovation would be welcome, forthcoming research shows the timescales associated with invention, demonstration and deployment of technology are long. Whilst improvements to technologies are hugely important, the emergence of entirely new technologies remains very uncertain. Support for innovation should not be premised on wishful thinking about silver bullet technologies. Many of the technologies we need to decarbonise already exist and have done so for several decades. The challenge is to drive costs down and encourage network innovation to better suit new sources of power.

Finally, the paper argues that whilst more effective carbon pricing would bring many benefits it is not a sufficient condition for significant energy system change. Regulation iv UK Energy Research Centre of emissions from existing coal fired power stations after 2025 would aid investor clarity and improve the prospects for investment in both low carbon and gas-fired generation.

• ETI consumer research highlights issues to address if the UK is to change how it heats the vast majority of buildings
• Today fewer than 4% have low carbon heating and 90% prefer gas central heating»Location constrains the heating solutions available to each building and existing buildings have their own constraints
• People are diverse, they want different things from their heating (for example cost, comfort, health) – the same solution will not suit everyone
• Improve low carbon heating designs so they tackle common problems and enhance home life
• Simplify installations so they are more convenient
• Enhance heating control so people can value what they spend, get what they want from low carbon systems and factor heat into renovation decisions

• Successfully deploying CCS would save billions of pounds – capturing industrial emissions at low cost, providing low carbon energy for industry, transport & heat and delivering negative emissions combined with Bioenergy
• To deliver these savings requires around 10GW of capacity by 2030 - needs capital investment around £21-31bn – based on efficient sharing of infrastructure and co-ordinated cluster/hub development
• Early investments in transport and storage infrastructure can unlock future unit cost reductions and strategic build out options. Strike prices below £100 per MWh are achievable in the 2020s
• 10GW scale deployment is achievable and affordable, capturing and storing around 50 million tonnes of CO₂ per annum from power and industry by 2030
• Developing capture technology options and diversifying geographical location can deliver reduced risk
• Success or otherwise in deploying CCS determines key aspects of the UK’s energy infrastructure architecture
• Delay increases reliance on nuclear and offshore wind – increasing system risk and costs before and after 2030

1. how material they are in UK bioenergy value chains, and
2. identifying which UK value chains offer a significant opportunity to deliver GHG savings relative to fossil baselines.

• Improving the thermal efficiency of significant parts of the existing UK housing stock over the next thirty years is an important part of a cost-effective UK decarbonisation strategy but cannot substitute for decarbonising the supply of energy to buildings.
• Uptake could be increased by making efficiency improvements an integral part of improving the amenity and value of the dwellings, rather than a series of independent measures.
• A focus on the interests of the owners and occupiers of the dwellings and the performance of the supply chain in delivering retrofit to them is critical to progress.
• Efficiency measures can provide cost-effective carbon savings and improve people’s comfort and living experience considerably. Although cost savings are rarely enough to justify the work at current energy prices, there is nevertheless a strong case for improving the quality of the UK housing stock, with energy being one element in this.
• There are significant opportunities to improve the performance of a traditional business-as-usual approach to housing retrofits. The culture, structure and practices of large parts of the supply chain will need non-trivial changes and investment to deliver this.
• A coherent long-term strategy that recognises the underlying economics will enable more entrepreneurial businesses to invest in the changes required to deliver more cost-effective, high performing retrofits. This will enable progress towards energy, poverty, health and housing goals.

• Low carbon heating must appeal to consumers if the UK is to tackle climate change.
• Consumers might welcome solutions if they enhanced their experiences using heat at home.
• Consumers will need help to get high quality experiences from low carbon heating solution.
• Policies could harness the emerging ‘smart home’ to garner public support for decarbonising heat.
• Decarbonisation could help the vulnerable access basic energy services, but there are also risks.

• Biomass combined with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) remains the only credible route to deliver negative emissions, necessary to meet the UK’s 2050 GHG emission reduction targets.
• Without targeted intervention and leadership, the opportunities to realise the full benefits of this negative emission potential could be missed
• Bio-hydrogen and bio-electricity are produced inpreference to biofuels and bio-methane
• Bio-heat is deployed across the UK, especially in earlier decades
• Gasification technology is a key bioenergy enabler, producing both hydrogen and syngas, and is one of the most flexible, scalable, and cost-effective bioenergy technologies
• Locational preferences for resource production are apparent: with Short Rotation Coppice Willow (SRC-W) in the west / north-west of the UK and Miscanthus in the south and east of the UK. Short Rotation Forestry (SRF) when grown is preferred in the south and east of the country, along with the collection of waste for making Refuse Derived Fuel (RDF).

• With technology and supply chain development there is a clear and credible trajectory to delivering commercial offshore wind farms
• Floating Wind hasthe potential to be a cost-effective, secure and safe low-carbon energy source which could deliver a levelised cost of energy of less than £85/MWh from the mid-2020s
• To deliver improved costs, offshore wind needs access to good quality wind resource close enough to shore and the onshore grid system so that transmission costs are minimised and operations/maintenance costs reduced
• Floating technology can provide access to high quality wind resources relatively close to the UK shoreline and in the proximity of population centres
• In water depths less than 30m fixed foundations will be the prime solution, in water depths over 50m floating foundations provide the lowest cost solution – a mix of these technologies is likely to offer the lowest cost pathway to deliver large scale deployment in the UK
• UK wind resources are abundant and exploitable – and already supplied 9.4% of the UK’s electricity needs in 2014
• The UK has the world’s highest offshore wind capacity with over 4GW installed, from over 1100 turbines, average power rating 3.4MW. A further 1.4GW is in construction, 4.8GW has planning permission and the world’s largest in-service offshore wind farm is in the outer Thames Estuary

• Successfully deploying Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) would save tens of billions of pounds to consumers and businesses – providing low carbon electricity, capturing industrial emissions, creating flexible low carbon fuels and delivering negative emissions in combination with bioenergy.
• CCS is a combination of proven technologies. Injection of CO₂ from an ammonia plant for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) began as far back as 1972 and “first intent” CCS began at Sleipner in 1996. By 2017, 22 plants will be running CCS technology applications, spanning post combustion and pre-combustion coal, natural gas steam reforming, bioenergy CCS (corn to ethanol), and applications from power, gas production, refi ning, chemicals and steel.
• The potential for cost reduction through deployment is significant:
  • Investment in anchor projects provides transport and storage infrastructure for subsequent projects to build on
  • Reductions in scope and increased project sizes to exploit economies of scale.
  • Risk reduction during the early stages of CCS deployment should attract more competitive fi nancing. Developers in the US, UK and Canada have committed to publically sharing their CCS designs and early operational experiences such that future projects can benefit.
• Additional cost reduction can be achieved through innovation in capture technology:
  • Post combustion capture, based on mature amine gas separation technology, has seized the largest share of the power market and still offers opportunities for further improvements.
  • Pre-combustion gasification technology potentially offers a clean, flexible alternative for coal, biomass and waste, and significant research, development and demonstration (RD&D) funding is resulting in continuous improvements, now feeding into demonstrations.
  • Other promising options using membranes, hydrates, cryogenics, enzymes, fuel cells and carbonate chemistry are actively being developed, and progressing towards commercialisation, such as vacuum swing adsorption (VSA) in a refinery in the USA. Post combustion temperature swing adsorption (TSA) has the potential to compete with amines in the future, but next generation adsorbents are still at a relatively early stage of their development.
  • NET Power’s supercritical CO₂ technology has the potential to be a game-changing technology. It faces several new challenges in equipment design and operation, but testing is under way. It is likely to take several years before it can be demonstrated at full scale.
• Given the current immature status of thenext generation of alternatives, amines or pre-combustion are likely to be the most investable options for the next five to ten years.
• One pathway to reducing the cost of CCS is deploying a small number of full scale plants sequentially (at least three), based on established technologies. Our analysis strongly suggests that risk reduction through sequential deployments of existing technology in the UK can drive output energy costs down by as much as 45%, largely through a combination of increased scale, infrastructure sharing and reductions in fi nancing costs. This paves the way for the introduction of higher risk emerging technologies once the overall CCS risk is reduced.

• The near total elimination of carbon emissions from existing homes is required by 2050
• There are two key solutions for low carbon home heating – local area schemes using heat networks and individual home systems using electric heat, each with different challenges
• Compelling consumer propositions and business models are needed. Social benefits will also be important and affordability needs to be a key element of transition planning
• A system level frameworkis required to package known but underdeveloped technologies into integrated solutions
• System designs and local spatial plans are needed for the efficient development of energy assets and to support end-user engagement
• Integrating the delivery of an energy system transition strategy into local planning processes, with local ownership, will be key to the delivery of near zero emissions
• Low carbon heating systems will introduce the need for new heat production and network assets, along with significant electricity network reinforcement, whilst the utilisation of local gas distribution networks will be reduced
•  The next decade will be critical in preparing for the transition and building confidence. A policy framework is required that supports the combination of individual and collective decisions and investments. Rapid implementation is then required from 2025

• Shipping emits substantial amounts of CO₂ which, without significant intervention, will rise as a proportion of our national emissions as we become less carbon dependent in other industry sectors
• Ocean voyaging ships have the biggest impacts on CO₂ emission due to the length and speed of their voyages and the current calculation method1 underplays the UK’s share of international shipping carbon emissions
li>There are economic advantages to emitting less carbon (and the economics of such are more cost-effective than some other carbon abatement opportunities in marine and other sectors)Using non-fossil fuels such as nuclear or high levels of biomass does not appear credible in the timeframe assessedIn the medium to long term (to 2050), the best potential to achieve substantial CO₂ reduction is by fuel consumption reductionli>ETI modelling has shown that a 30% fleet fuel consumption reduction can be achieved using innovative technologies with an economic payback period of around two years and a fuel price of $720/Tonne
• For the opportunity to materialise, fuel-saving technology demonstration is needed to give confidence to stakeholders and overcome market barriers

• Power Plant Siting Study (PPSS) -delivered for the ETI by Atkins
• System Requirements For Alternative Nuclear Technologies (ANT) - deliveredfor the ETI by Mott MacDonald with technical support from Rolls-Royce
• In-house ETI energy system modelling and analysis incorporating the learning from the PPSS and ANT projects

• The ETI has completed an assessment of the potential of using salt caverns, traditionally used to store natural gas, to store hydrogen (H₂) for power generation when the demand for electricity peaks daily. The use of these caverns would reduce the investment in clean power station capacity that the nation requires to build, and lift the average efficiency of the country’s responsive power system.
• Using salt caverns to store hydrogen has the potential to deliver clean, grid-scale load-following energy supplies
• The potential to store hydrogen changes inflexible gasification and reforming technology into competitive, highly flexible options for load following fossil fuel, biomass and waste fed power stations
• The UK has sufficient salt bed resource to provide tens of ‘GWe’ to the grid on a load following basis from H2 turbines
• Technologies making hydrogen from methane, such as steam methane reforming (SMR) and autothermal reforming (ATR) need to improve if they are to be competitve in power production from 100% hydrogen storage configurations – much of this improvement is already in hand in national clean fossil fuel, Carbon Capture and Storage and turbine  technology development programs
• Pre-combustion technology with storage offers flexibility to produce hydrogen and reduce the overall power generation investments

• There is a demonstrable route to making tidal stream energy competitive with other low carbon technologies;tidal stream has the potential to be a material part of the future UK energy system
• Tidal energy is capable of supplying 20-100TWh of the 350TWh of the UK’s annual electricity demand
• Potential impact of the tidal industry on UK GDP is estimated to be in the range of £1.4 - 4.3billion
• The cost of energy from tidal stream arrays can compete with other low-carbon sources
• The sector has transitioned in recentyears from small-scale prototype devices, through to full-scale demonstration and early commercial arrays are now in development
• The UK leads the rest of the world in the development of tidal devices
• Significant cost reduction will require coordinated investment in supply chain innovation, processes and peopleArray and device design integration is vital

• variation in capacity growth requirements;
• available physical space; and
• land value

• smart grid solutions;
• fault current limiters;
• energy storage; and
• conventional reinforcement

• Enable clear decision-making and incentivise investment to create efficiently configured heat networks;
• Encourage (or even mandate) adoption amongst customers;
• Ensure technology and process advances are compatible with the qualities of heat networks (notably the ability to deliver large quantities of heat, long-asset life and fuel source flexibility) that contribute to making them a compelling proposition.
• Deliver effective management of the changeover of heat supply networks and systems; and
• Ensure that network infrastructures are designed and work together efficiently across vectors in real time

• Even with aggressive cost reduction and innovation activities, current attenuator wave energy technologies are highly unlikely to meet the ETI/UKERC marine energy roadmap targets, and are therefore unlikely to make a significant contribution to the UK energy system in the coming decades
• Radical new wave energy extraction and conversion system approaches are needed to reduce cost and increase energy extraction and reliability.This will provide a trajectory towards lower cost solutions in the long term.

Energy saving feed-in tariffs (ESFITs) are a relatively new concept and are designed to use the same principles as Feed in Tariffs for renewable energy (REFITs). They offer a promising way of improving electricity efficiency and reducing electricity demand, thereby decreasing carbon emissions.

The Electricity Market Reform proposals which form part of the 2012 Energy Bill provide a bias towards investment in new supply that could be addressed using ESFITs. 

In the context of EMR, ESFITs offer a means of delivering decarbonisation with a lower impact on consumer bills.

Because ESFITs do not rely on energy companies, they would provide incentives for innovation in project delivery in a much wider range of actors including householders, community groups, local authorities and small businesses.

The concept of ESFITs is simple, but there are policy design issues that still need to be addressed.

This briefing note describes the amount of gas contained within Great Britain’s gas transmission and distribution networks, and how this changes over a day to support variations in demand. The hourly data covers the 63-month period from 2013-01-01 to 2018-03-07.

The amount of gas contained within the higher-pressure tiers of Britain’s gas transmission and distribution network is termed ‘linepack’; literally, it is the amount of gas packed into the pipelines.

Linepack is proportional to the pressure of the gas in the pipelines, increasing the pressure increases the amount of gas, and thus the energy contained therein. The amount of linepack changes throughout the day due to the varying levels of pipeline pressure. This flexing of pressure provides a method to help match the supply and demand for gas within a day.

The scale of energy that can be stored and released by varying linepack highlights its importance as a means of operational flexibility, helping to balance the changes in national primary energy demand.

The scale of the within-day flexibility currently provided by the natural gas transmission and distribution networks points to a formidable energy systems challenge; how to provide low-carbon within-day flexibility to future energy systems at a reasonable cost.

To recover the cost of energy policies which support the transition towards a low carbon energy system, levies are applied to household and business energy bills. This briefing note focuses on the levies applied to households.

Household energy policy costs

Energy policy costs are applied to household electricity and gas bills, equating to 132, or 13% of the average energy bill in 2016. This research highlights how low-income households are hit hardest by the current arrangements as the poorest households spend 10% of their income on heat and power in their homes, whereas the richest households only spend 3%, so any increase in prices hits the poor disproportionately.

Energy service demands in the UK

Household electricity and gas use represents only 12% of total final UK energy use. Total energy use includes all the energy used to provide househ

Midstream Infrastructure

The Midstream Infrastructure briefing considers the critical infrastructures - both hard and soft - that are necessary to link gas suppliers to end users. In many ways this is the most complex, least studied and most important part of the UK's gas supply chain. This briefing describes the various elements of the Midstream, assesses their current status, considers the potential impact on Brexit, and the challenges they pose in relation to future UK gas security.

The key challenge that the Midstream has to manage is the strong seasonality of UK gas demand, which is driven largely by winter demand for domestic heating. However, in recent years the growth of low-carbon generation (wind and solar) has introduced the additional complexity of intermittency, which is resulting in swings in gas demand on a much shorter time-frame. This is a challenge that is only going to increase in the future as coal-fired generation closes (by 2025) and intermittent low-carbon generation continues to grow.

The Future Role of Gas

The majority of studies of energy security focus on upstream security of supply. More recently, as the low-carbon transition has gathered momentum, there has been increasing interest in security of future demand as a challenge to the integrity of the gas supply chain. 

This briefing is divided into five sections. The first section examines the current role of natural gas in the UK energy mix, as well as recent trends in power generation. The second section reports on recent research by UKERC on the future role of gas in the UK. The third section examines what National Grid’s (2017a) most recent Future Energy Scenarios have to say about the future role of gas. The fourth section reviews other industry analyses about the future role of gas. The fifth, and final section, examines the ways in which Brexit complicates the situation. The briefing concludes by highlighting the policy challenges in relation to future

This briefing reports the findings of the first UK Gas Security Forum, which brings together a range of stakeholders
from government, business, think-tanks and academia to consider the impact of Brexit on the UK gas industry. The aim of the Forum is to inform the Brexit negotiations and the formulation of a Post-Brexit UK Gas Security Strategy.

The Forum builds on previous research funded by UKERC on:The UKs Global Gas Challenge(Bradshaw et al. 2014) andThe Future Role of Natural Gas in the UK(McGlade et al. 2016). The approach adopted combines a supply chain analysis of energy security with a whole system approach, that places gas security within the wider context of the decarbonisation of the UK energy system. In keeping with the wider framing of UK energy policy within the energy trilemma, it is assumed that a future UK gas strategy must de

This briefing paper summarises the key policy implications from the last of three working papers published by the Heat Incumbency Transitions Team. This research has investigated the role and behaviour of heat market incumbents in relation to the decarbonisation of heat.

Key messages

• The required transformation of the UKs heat system will have major implications for people and organisations involved with the sector.
• We define incumbents as people or organisations currently active in the UKs heat sector. Incumbents have the economic, social or technological capacity to influence the future of the heat system.
• Incumbents in the UK heat market are diverse and the impacts of heat decarbonisation will vary between sectors. A risk and opportunity analysis of the UK heat sector has highlighted that different heat decarbonisations pathways (electrification vs. gas decarbonisation) pose different risks for different sectors.
• Gas network owners and appliance manufacturers are the most active in their engagement with heat decarbonisation. This activity includes attempts to exert political power over policy and regulation as well as innovation activities. The upstream and supply sectors engage less with heat decarbonisation.
• The lobbying and innovation activities constitute attempts to maintain a gas based system for heat in which the gas network is decarbonised, primarily using hydrogen. This approach is unproven and risky but the idea has rapidly gained traction in the policy debate.
• Heat incumbents have also actively resisted change. These efforts include talking down other technologies and framing them as unworkable and developing coalitions of similar interests.
• Because of the ability of incumbents to lobby and innovate, new entrants in the UKs heat sector who may possess the best ideas and technologies may struggle to compete with incumbents.
• Based on our research, we have developed a number of policy recommendations for UK heat policy with implications for regulators and policy makers working on heat decarbonisation, as well as those involved in policy design process

Despite disabled people and low-income families with children being defined in policy as vulnerable to fuel poverty, there is very little evidence about how the needs of these groups are recognised or incorporated into policy decisions. There is alsono clear evidence on how energy efficiency policies actually affect these groups, and whether policy outcomes are consistent across the UK.

This policy briefingauthored by University of Yorks Department of Social Policy and Social Work (SPSW) and ACE Research, explores some of the key gaps in knowledge regarding justice in energy efficiency policy in the UK. The focus was on the impact of energy efficiency policies on disabled people, those with long-term illnesses and low-income households with children.

Key findings

The delivery of energy efciency policy is variable and patchy, with vulnerable groups ingreatest need not always eligible for support, or receiving support which fails to reflect their additional needs. To improve access for vulnerable groups and to meet their needs more effectively, the authors recommenda greater recognition of the needs of vulnerable groups, more consistent approaches across the UK and better cooperation with non-energy sectors.

The researchidentifies five key barriers to accessing vital fuel poverty support mechanisms and suggests ways in which access and outcomes can be improved for all.

• Current energy efciency programme design leads to an emphasis on meeting targets at the lowest cost -the numbers game. There needs to be a greater emphasis on the positive impact of intervention on the household rather than a focus on least cost.
• Households in need are not always eligible and the mechanisms for nding households needs to improve. Greateraccess to high quality data, data matching and data sharing wouldenable households to be targeted more effectively.
• Vulnerable customers are often unaware they are eligible for support and mechanisms for nding these people need to improve. Workis requiredto improve the trustworthiness of some of the schemes promoted.
• Current programmes focus on technical improvements to buildings rather than the needs of vulnerable groups. Thereneeds to be shift towards developing abetter understanding of the needs of these people and how they engage with energy.
• The delivery of existing energy efficiency support programmes across the UK is patchy.Government should aim for consistent outcomes for households wherever they live.

This briefing draws out the key messages from the UKERC report The UK Energy System in 2050: comparing low-carbon resilient scenarios, – which describes and compares a series of model runs, implemented through the UK MARKAL modelling system, which was developed through UKERC with funding from the Research Councils’ Energy Programme. This has revealed some consistent patterns showing how the UK energy system might develop in future, which are discussed in detail in the full report.

Under the UK Climate Change Act 2008, the government has committed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050 relative to 1990 levels (Climate Change Act, 2008). This will require a large shift in the UK’s energy system, ranging from energy production, across transmission to consumption.

The public are implicated in the transition process as energy users, increasingly also as energy producers and as active members of society who might support or oppose energy projects and policies. Previous research (Demski et al., 2015; Parkhill et al., 2013) has shown that there is widespread public support for transitioning to a low-carbon, affordable and reliable energy system – however, this change is associated with costs and it remains to be seen how these costs will be covered.

This research explores the views of the British public on how the energy transition should be financed. Drawing on a survey of 3,150 respondents and focus groups in 4 locations across Great Britain, it investigates what responsibility members of the public assign to government, energy companies and the general public for financing energy system change.

Research findings

The results highlight widespread support for an energy system that ensures affordability, reliability and low carbon energy sources. Energy companies and the government were assigned primary responsibility for contributing financially to energy transition, as they were seen to have the structural power and financial means to implement necessary changes. Respondents also indicated that the general public ought to contribute as well, although the public was perceived to be paying over the odds already (through bills to the energy companies and levies to the government). Nonetheless, research participants expressed willingness to accept between 9-13% of their energy bills going towards environmental and social levies.

Distrust in energy companies and government

Willingness to contribute financially towards the energy transition was also found to be dependent on the perception that energy companies and government are contributing financially and showing real commitment to energy system change. It was also notable that this condition was not currently thought to be met; distrust in this regard was particularly evident in focus group discussions.

Distrust in companies: People believe that the majority of energy companies are driven primarily by profit motives leading to inadequate commitments with regards to energy transition goals such as investing in low-carbon energy and ensuring energy affordability.

Distrust in government: The government, and politicians in particular, are seen as too closely connected to the energy industry, leading to inadequate and ineffective regulation of energy companies and their opaque practices.

Examining what underlies people’s distrust, it is evident that the public has a number of justice and fairness concerns that need to be addressed. In particular, beliefs concerning distributive justice (i.e. how costs are distributed across society) and procedural justice (i.e. respectful treatment, transparent practices and decision-making) are important for public acceptance of responsibility and costs.

Key recommendations

Addressing the issues underlying the trust deficit will be challenging, but this is nonetheless important if we are to ensure that there is to be broad societal consent and engagement with the low-carbon energy transition. To begin this process, the briefing includes the following recommendations:

1. Government and energy industry must show strong and clear commitments to low-carbon energy system change
2. Greater transparency and accountability regarding costs, decision-making and practices in relation to financing energy transitions
3. Greater clarity and justification for how money is spent by government and energy companies
4. Innovative thinking on how to distribute current and future costs in a fair manner across society
5. Finding ways to credibly show that energy companies are not driven by profits alone
6. Robust and consistent evidence of clearer separation between government and the energy industry

This briefing note provides a short introduction to the application of the ecosystem services approach in enabling the sustainable transformation to a low-carbon energy system.

This paper examines public engagement with energy in the UK.

Using mapping techniques, the paper investigates instances of engagement with energy between 2010-2015.

The paper concludes with a number of practical recommendations to assist the move towards a broader, whole systems approach to engaging society in low carbon transitions.

Read Jason Chilvers' blog about the project here.

• Public awareness of energy security issues is low – and the issue is seen as less controversial than climate change
• Once the term is explained, however, people are concerned that it is not high enough on the political agenda
• People report that messages related to energy security are not being communicated clearly
• They feel that the responsibility for action lies with government, rather than with themselves
• People are generally supportive of renewables, but current coverage is creating uncertainty and the discourse between politicians, scientists and the media is causing people to switch off
• People are unhappy about the UK’s dependence on gas imports, with some open to nuclear power
• Scientists need to take greater responsibility for bringing energy security onto the political agenda.

UKERCs 2017 Review of Energy Policy, appraises energy policy change over the last 12 months, and makes a series of recommendations to help meet the objectives of the governments Clean Growth Plan.

Our main recommendations are:

1. ‘Develop a strategy to avoid ‘cliff edges’ for the energy sector due to Brexit, including effects on interconnectors, the single electricity market for the island of Ireland, and nuclear power.
2. A White Paper that includes stronger incentives for energy efficiency across the economy, and an enhanced programme of low carbon heat demonstration and evaluation.
3. Learn from the success of offshore wind by extending competitive auctions in the power sector.
4. Minimise the costs of electricity system change and renewables integration by increasing incentives for flexibility.
5. Complement the additional funding for CCS innovation with a new strategy for deployment in the industrial and power sectors.
6. Ensure that vehicle taxation and other incentives are compatible with the target for phasing out new conventionally fuelled cars and vans by 2040. This should be complemented by a wider strategy for mobility that takes into account anticipated new services and business models.
7. A more comprehensive programme of action to involve citizens and communities in the clean energy transition, building on ‘Green Great Britain Week’.
8. Identify opportunities for energy policy learning across the UK – particularly in the areas of heat, engagement and energy efficiency.

1. The transition to net-zero will affect the whole economy. Investment and policy decisions by all government departmentmes need to be compatible with this transition.
2. Policies to support renewable electricity generation should be more ambitious, building on deployment and cost reduction successes. Action is also needed to ensure electricity market rules are fit for a fully decarbonised power sector.
3. Decisions by the energy regulator, Ofgem, should also be compatible with net-zero. This includes enabling investment in local electricity networks to facilitate heat and transport decarbonisation, and ensuring more active use of existing networks.
4. Local energy systems could play a significant role in achieving net-zero, particularly in the integration of electricity, heat and transport. More resources and greater powers for Local Authorities will help to ensure the potential for local action is realised.
5. A clear plan is required for upgrading the UK housing stock. A heat and energy efficiency White Paper must include policies for widespread deployment of low carbon heat (including demonstrating hydrogen at scale) and for prioritising low income households.
6. Whilst the decarbonisation of industry is receiving more attention, policy initiatives are not joined up. Funding for specific projects and industrial clusters should be complemented by market creation policies, including for carbon capture and storage.
7. Our analysis shows that achieving net-zero requires the phase out of fossil-fuelled vehicles to be brought forward to 2030. Immediate action is also required to counter the rapid increase in sales of larger cars (including SUVs).
8. Plans to meet net-zero should maximise environmental co-benefits. Potential negative impacts on ecosystems should be assessed and mitigated.
9. Continuing uncertainty about the UK’s changing relationship with the European Union has already affected decarbonisation plans. Whatever the outcome, close co-operation with the EU is likely to make it easier to achieve net-zero.
10. The transition to net-zero should not compromise energy security. In light of the events on August 9th, responsibilities for ensuring system resilience need to be clarified and applied in a more rigorous way.

In this issue of UKERCs annual Review of Energy Policy, we discuss some of the effects of COVID-19 on the energy system and how the unprecedented events of 2020 might impact energy use and climate policy in the future.

Focusing on electricity demand, transport, green jobs and skills, Brexit, heat, and societal engagement, the Review reflects on the past year and looks forward, highlighting key priorities for the Government.

Key recommendations

Electricity

The scale of investment in the power system required over the coming decade is huge. A big challenge is market design. We need a market that can incentivise investment in low carbon power and networks at least cost whilst also providing incentives for flexibility. Output from wind and solar farms will sometimes exceed demand and other timesfallto low levels. The right mix of flexible resources must be established to deal with variable output from renewables, with the right market signals and interventions in place to do this at least cost.

Mobility

The end of the sale of fossil fuel cars and vans by 2030 must be greeted with enthusiasm. Yet if this is to play its part in a Paris-compliant pathway to zero emissions, it must be one of many policy changes to decarbonise UK transport. Earlier action is paramount, and we recommend a market transformation approach targeting the highest emitting vehicles now, not just from 2030. Phasing-in of the phase-out will save millions of tons of CO2 thus reducing the need for radical action later on. The forthcoming Transport Decarbonisation Plan has a lot to deliver.

Green jobs and skills

COVID-19 recoverypackages offer the potential to combine job creation with emissions reduction. A national housing retrofit programme would be a triple win, creating jobs, reducing carbon emissions and make our homes more comfortable and affordable to heat. However, UKERC research finds that there are significant skills gaps associated with energy efficient buildings and low carbon heat. UKERC calls for a national programme of retraining and reskilling that takes advantage of the COVID downturn to re-equip building service professions with the skills needed for net zero.

Brexit

As the UK leaves the EU on the 1st January it will lose many of the advantages of integration. With new regimes for carbon pricing, trading, and interconnection yet to be agreed, there will be a high degree of uncertainty in the near to medium term. Given upward pressure on energy costs,delays to policy, and this uncertainty surrounding new rules, the overall effects of Brexit are not positive for UK energy decarbonisation.

Heat

UKERC research calls for action on heat to deliver the net zero technologies that we know work - insulating buildings and rolling out proven options. We need to end delay or speculation about less-proven options. Analysis is consistent with recent advice from the CCC that heat policy should focus on electrification whilst exploring options for hydrogen. We need to break the pattern of ad hoc and disjointed policy measures for heat and buildings, and develop a coherent, long-term strategy. This would be best achieved as an integral part of local and regional energy plans, involving local governments as coordinating agents. The aspirations for heat cant be realised unless we also take actionon the skills gap.

Societal engagement with energy

Achieving net zero in 2050 will entail significant changes to the way we live, what we eat and how we heat our homes. The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that when faced with a threat, society can change rapidly. Engaging society with the net zero transition also needs to change, it needs to be to be more ambitious, diverse, joined-up and system-wide, and recognise the many different ways that citizens engage with these issues on an ongoing basis.

With a focus on gas and the UK continental shelf, industrial decarbonisation, heat, mobility and the environment, we look at developments both at home and internationally and ask whether the UK is a leader in decarbonisation, and if the transition is being managed as well as it could be.

As we reach the end of 2018, the scorecard for UK energy policy is mixed. Optimists can point to rapid emissions reductions, cost falls in renewables and the centrality of clean energy within the Industrial Strategy. Ten years after the Climate Change Act was passed, UK greenhouse gas emissions have fallen by 43% from the level in 1990. The UK is on the way to meeting the first three carbon budgets, and a transformation of the power sector is well underway.

However, if we turn our attention from the rear view mirror, the outlook is more pessimistic. As the Committee on Climate Change pointed out in June, there are an increasing number of policy gaps and uncertainties. If not addressed promptly, meeting future carbon budgets will be much more challenging. For some of these gaps, there is a particularly clear and immediate economic case for action.

Key recommendations:

The government needs to take urgent action to ensure that the UK continues to meet statutory emissions reduction targets, and goes further to achieve net zero emissions. This not only requires new policies to fill looming gaps in the portfolio, it also requires much greater emphasis on sharing the benefits and costs of the low carbon transition more equitably. Our main recommendations are:

1. We repeat our call for a heat and energy efficiency White Paper, and recommend that the Industrial Strategy mission to reduce building energy use is extended to existing buildings.
2. A better, more targeted approach to the energy needs of low-income households is required. Energy efficiency investment for these households should be funded via general taxation.
3. Urgent large-scale trials of heat decarbonisation using hydrogen are required to understand whether it could be technically, economically and socially viable.
4. A dashboard of indicators is needed to monitor gas security during the energy transition. The current one dimensional approach is not sufficient.
5. Future electricity policy should build on the Electricity Market Reform policies that have worked well, and adapt them in the light of changes in technologies and costs.
6. Changes in incentives for ‘black start’ and other ancillary services are necessary to ensure that the electricity system remains resilient as it changes.
7. The target for phasing out conventionally fuelled vehicles is inadequate and does not fit with our emissions targets. The 2040 date should be brought forward and linked to accelerated investment in networks and charging.
8. The Industrial Strategy needs to be strongly linked to market creation policies for low carbon technologies. Carbon capture and storage is in particular need of such policies to progress beyond its current holding pattern.
9. To ensure widespread support for the energy transition, there needs to be more focus on equity and justice. The UK government should consider setting up a process similar to Scotland’s Just Transitions Commission to achieve this.
10. Continued vigilance is required to mitigate any negative impacts of Brexit, particularly those that could affect integration with European energy markets.

This review takes stock of UK energy policy ahead of the Autumn Statement, Industrial Strategy and new Emissions Reduction Plan. Its main recommendations are:

1. An integrated, evidence based approach to the new Industrial Strategy and Emissions Reductions Plan. The Industrial Strategy should set out clear priorities and the mechanisms for realising benefits for the UK
2. A new White Paper on Heat and Energy Efficiency
3. A Gas by Design approach to the future of gas that is compatible with carbon budgets and targets
4. A new approach to CCS commercialisation and deployment, in response to the Oxburgh report
5. An extension of the Levy Control Framework beyond 2020, and plans for auctions that include most large-scale electricity technologies and demand reduction in a single auction
6. Reform of the Capacity Mechanism so it gives equal

Too often fuel poverty is thought of as an issue that only impacts older disabled people, but the reality is that fuel poverty blights the lives of disabled people of any age: from children, to adults of working age, to older people. 

The evidence gathered through the Policy Pathways to Justice in Energy Efficiency project is based on in-depth research conducted with national policy makers, with stakeholders who implement energy efficiency policy and with households on low incomes. It provides a clear picture of the energy needs of families on low incomes and of what needs to happen to make a real difference in their lives.

This guide for practitioners takes these findings and turns them into practical steps for people working in the fuel poverty and energy efficiency sectors supporting disabled people.

Associated documents

• Access the policy briefing here.
• Access the working paper here.
• Access the practitioner guide for those working with families here.
• Read the press release here.

Fuel poverty remains a pressing issue for over 4 million households in the UK today. Families with children living on low incomes are at particular risk of experiencing fuel poverty, and its effects can penetrate deep into everyday life and into the practical, social and emotional worlds of those who encounter it.

The evidence gathered through the Policy Pathways to Justice in Energy Efficiency project is based on in-depth research conducted with national policy makers, with stakeholders who implement energy efficiency policy and with households on low incomes. It provides a clear picture of the energy needs of families on low incomes and of what needs to happen to make a real difference in their lives.

This guide for practitioners takes these findings and turns them into practical steps for people working in the fuel poverty and energy efficiency sectors.

Associated documents

• Access the policy briefing here.
• Access the working paper here.
• Access the practitioner guide for those working with disabled people.
• Read the press release here.

Evidence breifing from ESRC drawing upon research from the UK Energy Research Centre, outlined in the paper Modelling the uptake of plug-in vehicles, examines the timing, scale and impacts of the uptake of plug-in vehicles in the UK car market from a consumer perspective. The results show the importance of accounting for the varied and segmented nature of the car market, social and environmental factors, as well as considering how different uptake scenarios affect wider lifecycle emissions.

A UKERC policy briefing considers some of the changes that are affecting energy systems and energy policies in the UK and the EU; and what the energy relationship between the UK and the EU might look like in future.

This briefing paper uses the example of a changing UK/Scottish government relationship after Brexit to demonstratehow to analyse the role of politics and policymaking in the transformation of energy systems.

Brexit will create a new division of policymaking responsibilities between EU, UK, and devolved governments.

In this paper we divide energy policy competences according to levels of government. Initially, it suggests that we cangenerate a clear picture of multi-level policymaking. However, the formal allocation of competences only tells a partialstory, because actual powers may operate differently from the strict legal picture. These blurry boundaries betweenresponsibilities may be further complicated by Brexit, even if it looks like the removal of a layer of government willsimplify matters.Instead of imagining clearlines of accountability, think of energy policy as part of a complex policymaking system in which the link between powers, practices, and outcomes is unclear and an energy system, in which government isonly one of many influences on outcomes.

Key findings

• Brexit could have a major impact on UK energy policymaking, but its likely effect remains unclear.
• We can predict major changes to formal policymaking responsibilities. There is less certainty of the policies that may
  arise from EU, UK, and devolved governments.
• The law is only one aspect of policy, and policy is only one influence on energy system outcomes.
• Systems thinking helps inform discussions of, for example, the impact of Brexit on the transition to a low carbon
  energy system.
• However, terms suchas energy systems will only be useful when researchers and practitioners clarify their meaning and identify the role of policy in their transition.

Energy efficiency in homes can play a key role in delivering energy affordability, sustainability and security. Significant investment from the both public and private sector is required to realise the benefits of improved energy efficiency, but needs policy support.