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Social Value is a rising policy agenda in the UK, formalised in legislation by the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012. It refers to social, economic and environmental benefits whose value is not captured in financial flows. Whilst multiple tools and methodologies are available to measure Social Value, there is little consensus on which method is best to use in different contexts. This report reviews options and considers how best to measure Social Value in the context of major energy infrastructure projects such as HPC.

The report finds that value is highly contingent and subjective, and that what is valuable is not always tangible. It therefore emphasises the importance of qualitative measures of Social Value alongside quantitative data or monetary estimates, recognising the limits of assigning financial values to some types of outcome. It also stresses the importance of involving stakeholders to find out what matters to them and what they most value.

Delivered as part of the Energy-PIECES project this report was developed during a secondment at EDF Energy

This report describes the findings of a nationally representative British survey (n=961) conducted in March 2013. The main aim of the survey was to assess British attitudes to nuclear power and climate change two years after the Fukushima accident. The results are compared to a number of British surveys that were conducted at different stages before and after the Fukushima accident (2005, 2010, 2011, and 2012). This provides an overview of how public attitudes to nuclear and climate change have developed over the past decade and in particular after the Fukushima accident. In the longer term the data will be used for more detailed cross-national comparisons with Japan.

The work by Poortinga and colleagues (2013) has shown that British and Japanese publics have responded very differently to the Fukushima accident. However, the surveys included in the analyses were not specifically designed to examine the impacts of the Fukushima accident and contained different sets of questions. Comparisons could therefore only be made on a small number of items.

This new survey builds upon the previous work conducted by the authors of the study (Poortinga et al., 2006; Spence et al., 2010; Aoyagi et al., 2011; Demski et al., 2013) and examines British attitudes to nuclear power and climate change two years after the Fukushima accident. The British survey was coordinated with a similar survey in Japan allowing a detailed cross-national comparison of the long-term impacts of the Fukushima accident on public attitudes to nuclear power and climate change. The Japanese survey was conducted in February 2013 (Aoyagi, 2013).

This report describes the main findings of the British survey conducted in March 2013. The results are contrasted with previous British surveys where possible (i.e. Poortinga et al., 2006; Spence et al., 2010; Demski et al., 2013). Technical details of the previous surveys are provided in Box A. In the longer term, the data will be used for more detailed statistical analyses and cross-national comparisons with Japan.

• Negotiations over the terms of ‘Brexit’ are likely to be lengthy, complex and difficult. Energy is one policy area in which it may be easier for the UK and future EU27 to find common ground

• Energy cooperation over the past decades has helped European countries to enhance their geopolitical security, respond to growing climate threats, and create a competitive pan-European energy market. Maintaining close cooperation in this field, and the UK’s integration in the European internal energy market (IEM), will be important for the UK and the EU27 post-Brexit.

• Strong UK–EU27 energy cooperation could help ensure that existing and future interconnectors – physical pipes and cables that transfer energy across borders – between the UK, Ireland and the continent are used as efficiently as possible. As European economies, including the UK, look to decarbonize further, interconnectors will help minimize the costs of operating low-carbon electricity systems, and help lower electricity prices for UK consumers.

• The UK and the EU27 have identified the special relations between the UK and the Republic of Ireland as a priority for negotiations. Any future agreement needs to maintain the Single Electricity Market (SEM) across the island of Ireland, as failure to do so could result in an expensive duplication of infrastructure and governance.

• EU funds and European Investment Bank (EIB) loans account for around £2.5 billion of the UK’s energy-related infrastructure, climate change mitigation, and research and development (R&D) funding per year. Replacing these sources of finance will be necessary to ensure that the UK’s energy sector remains competitive and innovative.

• The UK intends to leave Euratom, the treaty which established the European Atomic Energy Community and which governs the EU’s nuclear industry. This process – dubbed ‘Brexatom’ – will have a significant impact on the functioning of the UK’s nuclear industry, particularly in respect to nuclear material safeguards, safety, supply, movement across borders and R&D. Achieving this within the two-year Brexit time frame will be extremely difficult. The UK will need to establish a framework that it can fall back on to ensure nuclear safety and security.

• Remaining fully integrated with the IEM would require the UK’s compliance with current and future EU energy market rules, as well with some EU environmental legislation. The UK government, British companies and other relevant stakeholders will need to maintain an active presence in Brussels and European energy forums, so that constructive and informed engagement can be sustained.

• Without a willingness to abide by the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and in the absence of a new joint UK–EU compliance mechanism, the UK may be required to leave the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) – an instrument in the UK’s and EU’s fight against climate change. Leaving the ETS would be complicated, even more so if the UK leaves before the end of the ETS’s current phase (2013–20). To maintain carbon pricing in some form outside of the ETS, the UK would need to either establish its own emissions trading scheme, which would be complicated and time-consuming; or build on the carbon floor price and introduce a carbon tax. Either of these potential solutions would need political longevity to be effective.

• It is in both the UK’s and the EU27’s interests for the UK to continue to collaborate on energy policy with EU and non-EU member states. The best way to achieve this would be to establish a robust new pan-European energy partnership: an enlarged European Energy Union. In particular, such a partnership could offer a useful platform for aligning EU policies with those of third countries, including the UK, Norway and Switzerland, while allowing them to fully access the IEM and push forward common initiatives. Experience suggests that the EU27 would be more receptive to working within an existing framework or multilateral approach (as with the European Energy Community) than to adopting a bilateral approach (as the EU currently does in its energy relations with Switzerland).

This UKERC Research Landscape provides an overview of the competencies and publicly funded activities in nuclear fission research, development and demonstration (RD&D) in the UK. It covers the main funding streams, research providers, infrastructure, networks and UK participation in international activities.

UKERC ENERGY RESEARCH LANDSCAPE: NUCLEAR FISSION

• Section 1: An overview which includes a broad characterisation of research activity in the sector and the key research challenges
• Section 2: An assessment of UK capabilities in relation to wider international activities, in the context of market potential
• Section 3: Major funding streams and providers of basic research along with a brief commentary
• Section 4: Major funding streams and providers of applied research along with a brief commentary
• Section 5: Major funding streams for demonstration activity along with major projects and a brief commentary
• Section 6: Research infrastructure and other major research assets (e.g. databases, models)
• Section 7: Research networks, mainly in the UK, but also European networks not covered by the EU Framework Research and Technology Development (RTD) Programmes
• Section 8: UK participation in energy-related EU Framework Research and Technology Development (RTD) Programmes
• Section 9: UK participation in wider international initiatives, including those supported by the International Energy Agency

This paper examines global cost trends in nuclear energy, both in terms of historical contemporary costs and also historical forecasts of future costs. The rationale for the study is to support and inform the UKERC TPA report ‘Presenting the Future: An assessment of future cost estimation methodologies in the electricity generation sector’. Approximately 75 academic articles and grey literature reports have been reviewed for this case study, both for data gathering and analysis purposes, in order to achieve three specific aims:

• Examine the key trends in contemporary cost estimates and future cost projections (Section 2);
• Understand the drivers underlying these key trends and the reasons for disparities between anticipated cost levels and actual outcomes (Section 3);
• Identify implications for cost estimation methodologies (Section 4).